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As Kang’s thinking evolves, I hope that he will devote more attention to 
the political consequences of deeper and closer economic relations with China 
(pp. 66–67). China has emerged as the number one or number two trading 
partner of virtually every country in East Asia. From the perspective of any 
one of those countries, this trade dependence with China is asymmetrical 
because China possesses all the leverage. 3is worries some experts in the U.S. 
military community. I argue elsewhere, however, that despite this asymmetry 
economic dependence is in fact mutual. 3ough any trade partner may be 
expendable, China is dependent on other Asian countries as a group to supply 
materials and parts, facilitate technology transfer, and create wealth and 
in4uence, thereby bolstering the government’s legitimacy.7 3is mutuality is 
quite consistent with Kang’s views.
Adding to a growing scholarly interest in regions as pillars of global order, 
Kang’s thesis should stimulate fundamental questions regarding the complex 
interaction between the global system, the behavior of regional powers, and 
local responses. 3is reviewer came away from the book persuaded more 
5rmly than ever that East Asian countries have developed a regional order 
that is both stable and su6ciently 4exible to adapt to—and in4uence—a 
rising China. 3e burden of proof has now shi7ed to those who argue that 
Asia’s stability is 4eeting.
 7 Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 165–66. 
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In China Rising David Kang advances two claims—one empirical, one 
causal—that challenge the core tenets of classic international relations theory. 
First, Kang argues that East Asian states are in fact accommodating rather 
than balancing China. Second, he argues that this behavior is a result of the 
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speci$c conceptions of identity in China and her neighbors (p. 4). %ese 
arguments have critical importance for U.S. foreign policy in the region, as 
Kang rightly emphasizes in his conclusion. By arguing that the very nature of 
international interaction is speci$c to the culture of the actors, China Rising 
constitutes a formidable broadside against important strains in international 
relations literature. 
Admirable for its clarity and for its timely attention both to the 
peculiarities of Asian international a&airs and to Beijing’s role in the region, 
China Rising nevertheless su&ers from three main weaknesses: $rst, the 
book neglects detailed analysis of the core tools of hard balancing; second, 
the proposed causal argument not only fails in important cases but also 
neglects important alternate explanations; third, the evaluation of identity 
in China Rising falls short of the high standard established by other works 
in the constructivist tradition.
Kang’s empirical claim possesses some verisimilitude but is oversimpli$ed. 
Kang correctly observes that Asian states are not engaged in containment of 
China. Such a sweeping statement, however, illuminates little of importance 
regarding contemporary Asian security a&airs. In a helpful chart (p. 55) Kang 
disaggregates the region, sketching a wide range of behavior toward China: 
North Korea is actively bandwagoning with China, while Taiwan is balancing 
against Beijing; Vietnam and Malaysia are leaning toward North Korea’s 
strategy, while Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are following Taiwan 
in balancing against China. More o'en, however, Kang coats the region with 
a veneer of consistency that minimizes the importance of national di&erences. 
%e nuanced view of relations toward China a&orded by the chart is valuable, 
and indeed justifying the chart’s coding and explaining such wide variation 
would serve the $eld well. 
Doing so, however, would have required a more explicit focus on the 
metrics by which balancing policy is judged. Kang wisely steers away from 
incorporating “so' balancing” in his appraisal of Asian policy; such a concept 
is notably hard to evaluate systematically and objectively. Nonetheless, 
a richer discussion of how to array security policy is warranted in a book 
on “hard balancing.” %ough “military buildups and defense spending, or 
countervailing military alliances aimed at an adversary” (p. 52), do capture 
the broadest level of such behavior, a more exhaustive discussion would 
have considered the composition of military forces and a wider range of 
alignment patterns. Speci$cally, shi's in the make-up of military forces can 
conceal balancing attempts within a $xed budget. %us, Kang’s emphasis on 
cuts in Japanese ground forces obscures a shi' in Japanese capabilities that 
[ 159 ]
book review roundtable orn china rising
are militarily relevant to China.1 %e reinvigoration of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
that began in the late 1990s is clearly, if quietly, aimed at China (as is well 
understood in Beijing). Similarly, China’s occupation and militarization of 
Mischief Reef in 1995 was the turning point in U.S.-Philippine relations—not 
the later increase in the salience of the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests.2 
A more nuanced discussion of the core tools of hard balancing—military 
capabilities and variations in alignment patterns—would have complicated 
further the sweeping assertion that “East Asian states are not balancing China” 
(p. 4) and would have called attention to the wide variation in those nations’ 
policies toward the Middle Kingdom. 
Whether or not one accepts these empirical critiques, Kang’s causal 
argument fails in two ways. First, Kang’s correct statement that the United 
States lacks an Asian identity (p. 187) implies that the United States is 
not subject to the same culturally derived predisposition that leads true 
“Asian” states to “accept, rather than fear, China’s expected emergence as 
a powerful and perhaps the dominant state in East Asia” (pp. 197–98). If 
that is the case, why is the United States not balancing against China more 
(p. 189–92)? The answer is of course that China’s intentions are ambiguous 
and the spiraling dangers of the security dilemma lead the United States to 
hedge as other Asian nations have done.3 Asian identity needs not play any 
role in such an explanation.
Second, Kang neglects careful consideration of two core material factors: 
power ratios and geography. It is a standard prediction of realism that 
small states tend toward bandwagoning.4 %at some small states $ght back 
when invaded (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan), $nd great power patrons and 
involuntarily host proxy wars (e.g., Vietnam), or are di8cult to pacify a'er 
conquest does not systematically undermine this realist prediction, as Kang 
purports is the case (pp. 10, 192). Furthermore, the “stopping power of water” 
 1 In some cases Kang does take a more $ne-grained approach to military power; see the discussion 
of South Korea (p. 56) in particular. In other cases, more attention is needed; see, for example, the 
discussion of the Taiwan military balance (p. 98). 
 2 Kang’s own chronology on p. 139 suggests this. Other cases of alignment policy that would have 
bene$ted from a more detailed and systematic analysis are Japan in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 170) 
and Singapore (p. 62 and pp. 193–94).
 3 %is reviewer would characterize the policies of several Asian nations more as hedging rather than 
as accommodation relative to Kang’s coding. In other places I have criticized U.S. policy as being 
too much aimed at balancing. See Christopher P. Twomey, “Missing Strategic Opportunity in U.S. 
China Policy since 9/11: Grasping Tactical Success,” Asian Survey 47, no.4 (July/August 2007): 
536–59. %e issue of contention here, however, is not the empirical characterization of policy but 
rather—given the substantial di&erence in identity, Kang’s core independent variable—the lack of 
more widely divergent policy between the United States and the Asian states.
 4 See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, -e Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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(and long distance) greatly impedes the projection of power across seas and 
oceans for all but the most lopsided dyads.5 %ese factors account for much 
of the variation in East Asian states’ balancing against China. %us, Japan and 
Taiwan bene$t from moats and so can engage in the most robust competition 
with China of any state in Kang’s sample. Geographic contiguity, by contrast, 
curses Vietnam and Korea and forces both countries to cozy up to China. 
Singapore, miniscule in power terms but far away from China, can turn to 
the United States by hosting a major U.S. Navy command and tailoring a 
harbor to the United States’ most capable power projection asset, Nimitz-
class supercarriers.6 %ese factors explain the variation in Kang’s cases. Were 
Asian identity the paramount factor in explaining this variation, Taiwan and 
Singapore would be the most tolerant of China’s rise given shared cultural 
roots with the mainland.
Constructivism in general has enjoyed considerable success in challenging 
core tenets of the international relations literature.7 Constructivist literature 
is typically rather modest in terms of causal claims and is diligent in its rigor. 
It problematizes the sources and repositories of culture. It recognizes the 
importance of cultural malleability and change. It appreciates the multiplicities 
of competing themes in any national culture. Furthermore, much of 
constructivist literature is meticulous in its methodology for characterizing 
identity, typically drawing on an intensive, sociological approach to this 
challenging concept. In these respects, China Rising does not live up to the 
promise of the broader literature within which the book is situated.8
Kang does at times delve into the sociological sources of identity (the 
South Korean case is strongest, see p. 107–09). More o'en, however, Kang’s 
actual coding of national identity derives from a range of other factors, each 
with limitations. Polling is $ckle and not optimized for measuring deeply 
 5 %e term is from John J. Mearsheimer’s -e Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2001).
 6 Making the same geographic point is Robert S. Ross in “%e Geography of the Peace: East Asia in 
the Twenty-$rst Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–118.
 7 See, for example, Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign 
Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-
State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004); Anne L. Clunan, Reconstructing Grandeur: Identity and the Sources of Russian Security 
Policy (forthcoming, 2009); Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? -e Impact of Culture, Power, 
and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Alexander 
Wendt, Social -eory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996); and Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and 
Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 8 Note, however, that at times Kang makes clear he is aware of these issues (see, for example, pp. 21, 
49, 81, 83, and 103).
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held ideas concerning the nature of international relations. Domestic 
politics should be separated from, not con;ated with, cultural identity (for 
instance see the Japan case on p. 182). Likewise, the relationship between 
economic ties and identity can be mutually constitutive or epiphenomenal. 
%e Chinese leadership, for example, has a political need for rapid economic 
growth (p. 85), and this need certainly has important implications for 
Beijing’s foreign policy.9 Yet, it would be wrong to locate that preference in 
a culturally derived Chinese identity. 
Similarly, in China Rising Kang is aspiring to a characterization 
of an intersubjective identity that might shape international relations 
in the way Alexander Wendt has outlined.10 The preponderance of the 
characterizations of identity in the book, however, concerns a nation’s 
self-identification. This approach is more consistent with work by 
constructivists such as Hopf.11 Such a disjuncture between the independent 
and dependent variable at least requires explication: the way that the self-
identity of individual nations shapes the nature of the international system 
they constitute is not axiomatic.
Identity is a challenging concept to evaluate with rigor. An ethnographic, 
anthropologic approach to international relations has much promise, and 
indeed Kang is right to draw his reader’s attention to the merits of this 
approach. Such an approach may also have important implications for the 
study of East Asia in particular. China Rising serves as an important starting 
point for such work.
 9 Although, again highlighting a potentially $ckle area, many worry about the prospect that a 
xenophobic nationalism might be substituted for economic growth as a means to legitimize China’s 
failing authoritarian government.
 10 Wendt, Social -eory of International Politics.
 11 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics.
